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2. Delusions and Downstream Effects




	In recent work George Graham (2010) develops and defends a realist account of mental disorders, defending both psychological realism (mental disorders cannot be fully understood as brain malfunctions) and normative realism (mental disorders cannot be fully understood as just abnormalities or inconveniences). One challenge in defending such an account is to show how we can reconcile a scientific approach focused on facts and causes with the realist commitment to values and meaning. I read his account of delusions as an attempt to show how value and meaning take a central role in understanding. I aim to show that this account is unsatisfactory but points us in the right direction. 
	Graham begins with a symptom-focused challenge to categorical discussions of disorder, introduces a novel way to consider the nature of delusions, and proposes a significant revision to the dominant paradigm concerning delusions. The "standard approach" holds that our understanding of delusions requires us to discover the upstream causes in order to properly understand delusions and so rates upstream causes as the most important element in understanding delusion. By contrast, Graham argues that judgments about delusions should be based on its "downstream" effects on a person's life rather than solely the "upstream" causes of the state; both upstream causes and symptomatic profile are important, but the essential element in making a mental state a delusion is harmful downstream effects. I will argue that Graham has a valuable insight but gives insufficient guidance for applying that insight. In particular, Graham gives insufficient attention to the context of evaluation, confuses two kinds of understanding delusions, and fails to take seriously the basic harm of delusion. 
2. Delusions and Downstream Effects
	Whether current categories of  mental disorder reliably pick out real kinds is one of the most hotly contested questions of psychiatry. Some have raised doubts about the success of our current categories on theoretical grounds (Pickard 2009), while others have suggested that a symptom-oriented approach to diagnoses of mental suffering would be more fruitful and more accurate than our category-oriented approach (Bentall 2004). Graham starts from this background and proposes that we can understand delusions as symptoms better by examining them apart from judgments of disorder, a first step that may help resolve the questions about disorders.
	Separating delusions from disorders is difficult since most case studies of delusion are part of a larger diagnosis (typically of schizophrenia). To find an alternative description, Graham turns to an unlikely source: the biblical stories of Abraham and Jesus. Both stories feature a person hearing and obeying a voice that cannot be heard by others, perhaps suffering from a delusion. The advantages to this alternative approach? 1. It allows us to avoid the conceptual fetters associated with thinking about delusion in the context of schizophrenia. 2. It reveals that the common way of discussing delusion is wrongly focused on upstream causes rather than downstream effects (Graham 2010, 193).  
	The selected episode in Abraham's life is the sacrifice of his son. Abraham believes he is commanded to do so, and he attempts to do so until a last-minute miracle prevents the tragic action. Contemporary writers have asked what we should make of this case by asking us to consider how we would respond to a neighbor who acted in the same way. If we would judge the neighbor deluded, then surely we should judge Abraham the same way. How should we understand Abraham's experience? 
	We might conclude that we know a person is deluded if their beliefs and actions are unrestrained by common sense or background knowledge that they should be expected to have (194). Abraham is asked to do what is outside widely-shared moral norms.​[1]​ The voice may have seemed vivid and his knowledge certain, but obedience takes him far beyond acceptable behavior. What warrant could he have? The psychologist Brendan Maher (1999) defends the thesis that many delusions may be responses to unusual perceptual experiences. In such cases, the person has subjective warrant because their experiences are internally indistinguishable from those normally used as good evidence such as when we form beliefs from sense experience. The subject of a delusion may not be in reliable contact with the world, but  may yet be subjectively warranted in believing that they are. However, while unusual perceptual experiences may warrant belief in some cases, this will not hold in all cases, especially those with dire behavioral outcomes. Graham concludes that Abraham is a plausible candidate for delusion, so his case looks promising for delusion without other diagnosis (Graham 195). This judgment could be justified by a consideration of the symptoms and their downstream effects without needing to first resolve questions of acquisition.
	Is delusion "merely something bizarre and objectively unacceptable or without proper evidential support and out of touch with reality as the case of Abraham perhaps teaches us" (195)? This works with the gloss provided in the DSM-IV​[2]​ where delusions are identified as: 1. false personal beliefs, 2. firmly sustained, 3. often inferable from behavior, and 4. not typically accepted by members of one's culture or subculture (APA 1994). Graham argues that the DSM account is not very helpful and he challenges all four of the points enumerated above. His objection to the last point is most important: it is not clear why religious beliefs (the main culturally-based exemption from delusion) should be exempt, but if they are it shows that numbers matter when judging whether a belief is delusional. It is this point that leads Graham to Jesus. 
	Turning to traditional gospel accounts, we find a figure whose beliefs about his own divinity and his mission would, if claimed by our neighbors, sound like delusions of grandeur. Furthermore, Jesus may have had several disciples, but they would constitute a pretty small sub-culture. In addition,  his beliefs would not have been part of his upbringing in the way that most people acquire their religious beliefs. That is to say, Jesus did not grow up in a Christian home. Given that his beliefs are not explained by his cultural inheritance, were his grandiose beliefs delusions? Graham reiterates that this may well be a case of subjectively warranted beliefs based on unusual perceptual experiences and thus parallel with Abraham. If so, then the answer seems to turn on the question of whether Jesus was who he claimed to be, but the goal here is to see whether, even if Jesus' beliefs were false, we should judge him to be deluded. In fact, this is the second major point these biblical stories are meant to show: when we focus on the upstream causes (in this case whether certain experiences were veridical and if not what caused these beliefs), we miss the more important question of the downstream effects those beliefs have on their holder. The question of delusion has less to do with what Abraham and Jesus believed or why they believed it and much more to do with what effect these beliefs had on their lives.
	 Graham's suggestion is that we approach delusion not (or at least not primarily) in terms of the truth of its content, subjective warrant, or reference to group delusions but "in terms of its persistent and self-represented role in and consequences for a person's (like Christ's) overall psychological economy" (199). Religious beliefs and convictions are not always intrusive and can inspire a sense of meaning, creativity, and personal authority. This stands in stark contrast with effects of delusions which exacerbate existential concerns, shut the deluded off from others, and potentially devastate the individual. The experience of Jesus recounted in the gospels looks, for the most part, like a case of the first sort not the second. On this account, even if his beliefs were mistaken, objectively unwarranted, and even if he should have filtered them out using his background knowledge, Jesus was not deluded because his beliefs played a positive role in his life. 
	Contrast this with the view that what we need to do in order to correctly diagnose delusion is to "crack the acquisition code", to determine how delusions are generated so we can correctly determine whether an attitude is delusional (Graham, 202). Graham's first objection is that most diagnoses already fail to meet this requirement. Clinicians are nearly always in the dark about the acquisition of their patients' delusions and instead see the effects on the patients' lives. Second, the harm  associated with  delusion itself justifies attending to and treating such a condition, whatever the process of acquisition may be.​[3]​  
	Graham gives no final, conclusive statement about the subjects of his two "case-studies", but he does give a more fully developed statement on delusion: "Delusions constitute, I propose, a failure of prudent self-comprehension and responsible epistemic self-management and it is that sort of failure and its impact on a person that makes for a delusion, not or not just the bizarre, erring or inept manner in which a person represents self or world (206)." The main difference between Abraham and Jesus is the downstream effects of their unusual beliefs, not the source of their beliefs. I will contend below that this difference is neither clear nor adequate for improved understanding.
3.  Perspective, Understanding, Disconnection
	Graham's interpretation of Abraham and Jesus is reasonable and prima facie plausible. Jesus lived what was in many ways an admirable life and Abraham's attempted sacrifice of his son does seem like a deep moral failing. However, these evaluations are unduly narrow in making a case for the quality of life these figures attained. Consider Abraham. He lived a life that does involve this dubious moral act and it is a result of his hearing a voice. However, he also went from a mundane existence in the town of his birth to become a man of great importance and much wealth. His legacy as the father of a nation and even "the father of all who have faith" is surely in league with that of Jesus. 
	Jesus, on the other hand, does manage to avoid a great moral misdeed of Abrahamic severity. His life is unmarred by the kind of act that would horrify us if we found our neighbor pursuing it (though this might depend a lot on the neighborhood in question). Then again, Jesus died at an early age and we may well think that an early death for someone of his talents is a great harm. Add to this that he missed out on the great goods of a wife and family and was often without a home and we may be drawn to reconsider whether the voice Jesus heard did not in fact lead to downstream harms. We need not settle the question here. What does merit our attention is that it is unclear, depending on what events we focus on and with what perspective, that Abraham's delusion led him to a bad life whereas Jesus' delusions led him to a good one. We might judge that Abraham's moral violation is a serious harm to his character yet think that, all things considered, it was part of an admirable life. On the other hand, the goods that Jesus gained through assurance of his divine mission also lead to his untimely demise. Even on Graham's reading of delusion's harm, we must give a long view of the person's life to understand the harms and benefits that justify our claims about delusions. Those of us in a position to make such judgments must balance these concerns and the ambiguity of Graham's cases helps illustrate what  a difficult task this is. It requires careful attention to the context of a person's life as well as commitments to what constitutes a good life for a human being. We much weigh the goods of pleasure and freedom from anxiety against the goods of achieving some noble task and leaving a legacy for future generations. This requires weighing a range of downstream effects against one another, not just attending to the downstream effects. At first, I thought this ambiguity about these cases was merely a methodological problem for Graham. We could recognize that the accounts were not uncontroversial but still see that the justification in both cases were the downstream effects of a delusion-like experience. However, I contend that it is not a minor problem because it threatens the very task at stake: understanding delusions.
	To reiterate, Graham thinks we can understand delusions better not by looking upstream to causes but by looking downstream at the effects they have on the lives of those affected. If the downstream effects are harmful we have a case of delusion. If not then it seems counter-intuitive to call it a delusion. This may be the case, but it misses the point of the motivation for better understanding offered by the standard account. The standard account looks upstream to find the nature of things but also because the general trend in medicine has been to find cures by eliminating the causes of an illness. If we can find the cause of a delusion in a neural deficit or in a defective pattern of cognition, then we have hope of countering its effects. For the task of helping people, Graham's style of understanding harms is of limited usefulness because it requires a perspective that is unavailable to us when attempting to understand the potential delusion in order to help the person affected. He offers us an evaluation of whether a state is a harm from the perspective of eternity whereas we need a greater understanding from the perspective of an emergency. 
	Medicine, of course, requires some evaluation of how symptoms feature in a person's way of life and draws on past cases to make judgments about likely outcomes. However, when faced with the symptoms presented by Jesus or Abraham, a physician must make a judgment without full information about how a life will turn out. Given the harms typically associated with auditory hallucinations there is a strong pragmatic case for treatment. This kind of understanding of symptoms is aimed at understanding how to change them and so is legitimately focused upstream. Graham's understanding is an important part of a overall picture of delusion, but it gives us too little to go on when it comes to understanding in a treatment context. 
	Consider how we might respond to Abraham and Jesus. When we see that Abraham is going to offer up Isaac on the altar it is clear we ought to intervene and try to help him with his delusion. Likely, this prevents a pro tanto harm in that it prevents his gravely serious misdeed, but it also prevents an all things considered good by preventing his assurance that he was chosen by God to live a great life. When we see that Jesus is delivering the sermon on the mount, we may not take too seriously his claims about hearing the voice of God. Perhaps this is just metaphorical. However, it is difficult to imagine the physician who would not attempt to treat a delusion when Jesus reports that he is going to his death willingly because God has chosen him for this task. We are justified in taking action to eliminate or alleviate the effects of what looks like a delusion even though we may be unable to see what goods it may bring to the person's life all things considered. This is, in part, because delusions (or delusion-like states) so reliably lead to harm and, in part, because they are a harm whenever they occur: the harm of disconnection from reliable epistemic access to the world.
	I will return to the probable and sure harms of delusion, but first I wish to offer cases to justify my claim that we must act to prevent probable harms (and thus eliminate or at least reduce the effects of delusions) even when we cannot see the whole of a person's life. Consider two men who, plausibly, lived great lives despite (and, in part, because of) serious hardships: Franklin Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln. Roosevelt endured a paralytic illness and Lincoln childhood poverty and lack of education. From the perspective we gain at the end of their lives, it looks likely that had these hardships been removed these men would not have lived the great lives they did. However, I contend that those around them at the time would not have been justified in inaction. The physical illness of Roosevelt as well as the poverty and lack of educational opportunity of Lincoln are cases of likely harms that we ought to alleviate whenever possible. It is an implicit risk of such action that we prevent some people from attaining lives greater than they would otherwise have attained. We thus treat a prima facie harm and prevent the realization of an all things considered good. The overwhelming likelihood is that they are no more than harms, suffering that leads not to greatness but to misery and so we are justified in taking action. This is, I contend, the same with the cases of delusions or delusion-like states. Even if it may have an all things considered positive effect on someone's life that they hear voices, it is a pro tanto harm in that it disconnects them from the world and is a probable harm in that it reliably leads to a bad life in the majority of cases.
	My final worry about Graham's approach to reforming our understanding is that he insufficiently attends to the implicit harm and the probable harm of delusions. The implicit harm is that an experience as of a voice speaking to us (or whatever the particular experiential justification of the delusional state is) disrupts reliable contact with the world around us. The deluded person can no longer count on their experience to a degree that is normal for humans. This is a harm and a serious one, even if it has overall beneficial effects. To fail to address it is negligent. The second justification for action is that delusions do not always stay contained in a limited sphere of a person's psychological life. Once a person has accepted that the Queen of England is secretly in love with them or that Vladimir Putin is communicating state secrets to them via NPR, this is likely to lead to further disruptions in their "prudent self-comprehension and responsible epistemic self-management" and so we are justified in intervening to help them overcome the delusion even if they might have a better life for it.​[4]​ We cannot see their whole life but neither can inaction always be justified by the possibility that some pro tanto harm may have an all things considered beneficial effect in a person's life. Even when this looks likely to benefit the individual and likely to stay restricted to a small domain of their epistemic self-management, it is a substantive normative claim that the delusion-like set of experiences is not a harm. Graham does not explicitly defend this claim and so why we can leave a delusion in place, but I think he has provided the necessary tools for doing so.
	Consider a real-world case that challenges the picture I am giving here of always treating hallucinations: the Hearing Voices Network (HVN). The HVN is a consortium of mental health workers and clients, as well as others who hear voices but have avoided the mental health care system who advocate for a reconsideration of auditory hallucinations (Romme and Escher 1993, Smith 2007). The HVN argues that for those who are able to manage these voices, they are within the normal boundaries of human experience and do not need to be seen medically nor should they be considered to have a disorder. This is a substantive revision of the typical view. Does it helps Graham's case? Yes and no. No, in that it does not demonstrate that we need not consider auditory hallucinations to be harms. Yes, insofar as we can see from this normalization of auditory hallucinations how to make decisions about which case are all things considered harms and which are not. The HVN, like some disability advocacy groups, asks us to change our understanding of normal and healthy, but it does so by presenting individual cases where people are managing the voices they hear in a salutary fashion. What we have then, if such cases are plausible, is a justification of the voices as non-harms not because of their positive value but because of the fact that they are not a substantial harm at present. These voices are not a harm because the individuals have learned to live with them and, in some cases, even to welcome them as an enrichment. If successful, the HVN argument justifies a normative thesis about these individuals and their aberrant experiences that Graham fails to defend in his discussion of the  cases of Jesus and Abraham.​[5]​ 
	If when we consider the cases of delusion we find that there is a good chance it leads to a better life or is part of an ongoing minimally decent life, we should be hesitant to treat delusions that people manage well. However, it seems the paradigm cases and the great majority of people in this situation are not better off for their delusions. This is why it seems counter-intuitive to talk of positive delusions: they so rarely are positive. It is, of course, possible that our paradigms are skewed by the fact that those with positive delusions do not seek help and so go undiagnosed. But the standard account that looks upstream is seeking to understand (and find a way to help) in those cases where people do find themselves in contact with mental health professionals. In those cases, we are justified in assuming that delusions are not likely to be a part of overall prudent self-comprehension and thus looking downstream will not give us much greater understanding of the kind we need. Revising this judgment in individual cases has to be justified by contrary evidence from the person's life. Looking upstream may give us the understanding we need of how to prevent or alter these states and thus help those afflicted by delusions.  Yes, understanding that delusions harm people is part of understanding what makes a delusion what it is, but when what we need is understanding of how to prevent or treat them, looking downstream is insufficient.
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^1	 	This seems a problematic interpretation of the moral context. The reader will likely recall that Abraham's story comes early in the tradition, before Moses and the establishment of divine laws in a formal way. Given his background, human sacrifice may not have seemed all that bad. Counter-intuitive, sure, but if you think you have a miracle son, is it that hard to believe your miracle son could be resurrected or otherwise restored? 
^2	 	The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the standard guide to psychiatric diagnosis in the U.S. 
^3	 	Graham does attend later in the text to how the acquisition and persistence conditions may affect what treatments will work best. 
^4	 	Indeed, this may be a good example of why it will often be important to know whether the delusions are part of a larger disorder since this might give us better information about prognosis.
^5	 	There is, of course, a much milder position we could take. Those who manage voices well may be like diabetics who control their condition using diet and exercise. These people have a serious medical condition, but we need not medicate them or restrict their freedom. In addition, the diabetic case shows how effective management of a condition makes it counter-intuitive to call someone ill, even when they have a disease or disorder.
